JF Waste?

[Mark Roberts]

Aaron,

Presumably, the criticism of the Japan Foundation will continue until  
a defense is made by somebody with clout, and persuasive claims are  
given for why it should be getting more money, not less. These  
arguments probably need to be made not just for "advancement of the  
arts" or "cinema" but for broader values that concern society as a  
whole. Are representatives from the JF trying to address the media? It  
seems like a mistake to remain on the defensive.

The point by the former ambassador jibes with what I have read:  
funding for Bunkacho has had the lowest priority in the weakest  
ministry in the government. The JF appears to be an independent  
administrative agency under Bunkacho, but conspicuously, it is not  
shown on Bunkacho's org chart along with the other IAIs. What is their  
relationship, exactly?

A few other interesting points:

— Bunkacho is part of the Ministry of Education (MEXT). FY 2009 budget  
was 102 billion yen, which is just 1.9% of the total budget for MEXT.  
Where does the other 98.1% of their money go? Here's the chart: <http://www.mext.go.jp/english/yosan/001.htm 
 >. A breakdown of Bunkacho's budget is on p. 6 of this report: <http://www.bunka.go.jp/english/pdf/chapter_01.pdf 
 >. I would invite everybody to look at these budgets and ask  
yourselves about the priorities they seem to reflect.

— From its inception in 1968 through 1997, the budget for Bunkacho  
increased annually. After a few turbulent years in the late 90s, it  
increased again between 2001 and 2003. Since 2003, however, the budget  
has been essentially flat. Also, the majority of its expenditures go  
into the preservation of cultural properties. I have not yet found  
details on the support the JF gets from Bunkacho, but from what you're  
saying, it sounds like that now may be in jeopardy.

— If Bunkacho were compared with its European counterparts, the budget  
for the British Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Media is 11 times  
that of Bunkacho's. The French Ministry of Culture and Communication  
has a budget 14 times that of Bunkacho. In terms of per capita  
spending, Japan spent 478 yen per person in 2001, while England spent  
2,592 yen and France 4,334 yen.

— In the postwar period, cultural policy in Japan was broadly  
developed at a regional rather than a national level. This was mostly  
in reaction to the effects of high growth and concerns that regional  
identities and values were being lost. Money was spent primarily on  
the construction of "culture halls", a practice that continued through  
the 70s and 80s. The peak of the "bunka kaikan" boom was in 1984-85,  
with about 200 of these halls being constructed each year. However,  
the budgets for these projects generally did not include money for the  
organizations that would produce or display something in these new  
buildings. Many of them had aspired to become high-level performing  
arts centers, not associated with mass/popular culture, but due to  
lack of proper conception and management many lapsed into under- or  
dis-use (the so-called "hakomono mondai"). This became a recognized  
problem in the early 90s, when there was finally more significant  
criticism of the fact that no polices or programs were being  
implemented along with these cultural centers. The Japan Foundation  
got more involved in this issue around 1994, and the whole issue of  
arts management became more visible (though, again, at a regional  
level). One of the solutions to the malaise of these "culture halls"  
was to turn over their management to private firms. Might similar  
pressure be applied to the JF?

— During the lost decade, regional funding declined, and the need for  
national policies became more apparent. National policy has been  
largely oriented around the preservation of "high" cultural artifacts,  
and has not supposed popular culture (i.e., cinema) in any serious  
way. Japan has embraced neither of the two dominant models of cultural  
policy (i.e., statist vs. corporate; European vs. American).  
Priorities for culture and bases for cultural policy have not really  
been established. In 2002, one observer commented that "it is ironic  
that Japanese popular culture, which has been neglected by government  
policymakers, has been produced and exported very successfully by  
Japanese cultural industries. On the other hand, high culture in  
Japan, which is the main objective of government policymakers, is  
still largely based on Western imports, as it was at the end of the  
nineteenth century."

— In spite of this, there is a widespread sense that even in the  
sphere of high culture, government policymakers have not seriously  
considered what needs to be done to promote an "art world". This is  
reflected in the appearance of artists like Murakami Takashi, who have  
basically given up on the Japanese art world and seek recognition  
abroad (as explained in his "Geijutsu Kigyo Ron"). Another observer,  
commenting on this phenomenon: "Japanese cultural policies are  
unlikely to contribute to artistic change and the democratization of  
culture in the sense of increasing its accessibility."

At present, there is a trend to emphasize public accountability. While  
it is an occasion for public debate on culture and democracy, it also  
entails the politicization of culture and familiar problems that  
emerge as a result. This is what seems to be happening now with the  
discussion of pinku eiga and classification of films in terms of their  
"appropriateness" for foreign audiences. I would think that one  
possible rejoinder to this would be a broader discussion of Japan's  
lack of meaningful cultural policies, the miniscule budgets, and the  
disconnect between government and industry.

M