species concepts (this is long!)
warrena at bcc.orst.edu
warrena at bcc.orst.edu
Thu Nov 22 04:33:15 EST 2001
Happy Thanksgiving!!
If anyone is interested in complete citations to the
literature references in the text below, I would be
happy to provide them. They are all available in a
recent (2000) book edited by Quentin D. Wheeler and
Rudolph Meier: Species Concepts and Phylogenetic
Theory, A Debate. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
230pp. I highly recommend this book to any taxonomist
with strong feelings about their own species concepts.
It forces you to analyze and be critical of your own
beliefs on the subject; something I think we can all
benefit from, especially if we criticize taxonomic
decisions of other workers.
There is certainly no concensus among systematists as
to what species concept should be used. As James Kruse
has correctly pointed out(in quotes below,)the vast
majority of systematists outside of Lepidoptera do not
recognize subspecies. Subspecies are only used in a
few animal groups (when nomenclature for the entire
spectrum of life is considered). The use of subspecies
became popular in these animal groups (mostly birds,
mammals, and insects) after Mayr (1957)proposed his
Biological Species Concept (BSC); previous species
concepts used back to the time of Plato are frequently
referred to as Morphological or Typological Species
concepts. Subspecies have become less and less popular
since the works of Hennig (1966: Phylogenetic
Systematics) and the subsequent rapid rise of
cladistics and the use of cladograms to summarize
relationships (as well as the rapid rise of competing
species concepts). Subspecies are essentially never
used in most animal and plant groups. I know of no
formal definition for a subspecies that has been
proposed that may be applied in all cases for all or
most organisms (please let me know if you know of
one!). Most taxonomists agree that species exist and
can be identified, and most agree that species in
separate groups of organisms should be equivalent
taxonomic units. This is not a universal reality for
species (because of different species concepts), but it
is not even possible for subspecies since they
necessarily cannot be equivalent because there is no
standard definition for them. All workers that use
subspecies have different working definitions of
subspecies, and I have not seen any definitions clearly
presented in a way that can be applied in the real
world to all or at least most organisms (asexual
organisms present a challenge to most species concepts;
the BSC for example amdittedly cannot accomodate
asexual organisms). All of this means that in the
business of taxonomy, subspecies are entirely
subjective. They may be useful in summarizing
variation, but cannot be objectively applied. Workers
who propose subspecific names should strive to reach a
standard definition for a subspecies to remove some
subjectivity from their decisions. There is a whole
body of literature that is literally missing here...
The species problem is big enough! Mayden (1997)
identified at least 22 species concepts in the
contemporary literature. Wheeler and Meier (2000)edit
a debate bewteen proponents of what are probably the
six most widely applied species concepts:
Biological Species Concept (by Mayr),
"Biological species [are]groups of interbreeding
natural populations that are reproductively isolated
from other such groups."
The Hennigian Species Concept (by Meier and Willmann),
"Species are reproductively isolated natural
populations or groups of natural populations. They
originate via the dissolution of the stem species in a
speciation event and cease to exist either through
extinction or speciation."
The Phylogenetic Species Concept (sensu Mishler and
Theriot) by Mishler and Theriot,
"A species is the least inclusive taxon recognized in a
formal phylogenetic classification. As with all
hierarchical levels of taxa in such a classification,
organisms are grouped into species because of evidence
of monophyly. Taxa are ranked as species rather than
at some higher level because they are the smallest
monophyletic groups deemed worthy of formal
recognition, because of the amount of support for their
monophyly and / or because of their importance in
biological processes operating on the lineage in
question."
The Phylogenetic Species Concept (sensu Wheeler and
Platnick), by Wheeler and Platnick,
"Species are the smallest aggregation of (sexual)
populations or (asexual) lineages diagnosable by a
unique conbination of character states."
and the Evolutionary Species Concept (by Wiley and
Mayden),
"An evolutionary species is an entity composed of
organisms that maintains its identity from other such
entities through time and over space and that has its
own independent evolutionary fate and historical
tendencies."
Other concepts discussed by various contributiors
include the Recognition Species Concept (Patterson,
1973 to 1986), the Cohesion Species Concept (Templeton,
1989, 1994), and the Ecological Species Concept (Van
Valen 1976).
There are huge differences between some of these
species concepts, and in their application and
consequences. A strong proponent of any one species
concept should be familiar with other competing
concepts as well, to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of them all so that their own beliefs can be
better justified.
Even though I believe in a certain species concept (it
just happens to be one of those elaborated upon in the
Wheeler and Meier (2000) volume), and personally think
it is the most justifiable concept available, I respect
taxonomic work presented by workers with other species
concepts, and avoid "chuckling to myself" as others
apparently do, when they see taxonomic combinations
that are not consistent with their own species concepts
[I only chuckle when someone claims that their taxonomy
is "correct"]. If other workers can defend and justify
their use of alternate species concepts, they have
every right to use them. Their taxonomy is no
more "correct" or "incorrect" than any other taxonomy
justified under another species concept (assuming all
ICZN rules are met in all cases). It seems appropriate
to me that workers should have a defined, specific
species concept that is applied in their research, and
that the concept be consistently applied. This enables
workers to defend each and every taxonomic decision
they make on the grounds of their species concept.
The following are a few quotes (followed by my replies)
from the past week or two illustrating viewpoints
expressed on Leps-l about what people think species and
subspecies are. This is not meant to be a personal
attack on anyone, but is meant only to show the
diversity of species concepts among out list members,
and to clarify some statements (presented as factual)
that have been made on this topic that cannot be
justified.
On Nov. 9, Ron Gatrelle wrote:
"Too many subspecies have been described just on the
basis of how they look
alone. Evolutionary and biogeographic factors are very
important and often
neglected factors in taxonomic study. I still laugh to
myself when I see
some of the stuff the lumper lists have as subspecies --
based totally on
how a couple populations look to the human eye....
That is why I chuckle - their listings are totally
based on
human vision and totally non scientific."
My reply:
So what is totally non scientific about using
morphological characters to differentiate populations?
Since there is no scientific definition of a subspecies
(we only have ICZN rules dictating how to deal with
them), there cannot be anything "non scientific" about
how a worker treats them or what characters they use to
differentiate them. "Evolutionary" and biogeographic
factors are not always known with certainty, and only
add more ad hoc hypotheses to the to the theory of a
subspecies; making the hypothesis of a subspecies less
testable. In the eyes of many scientific philosophers
(as explained in works by Popper and Farris among
others) the best scientific hypotheses are those that
are the most testable, those with the fewest associated
ad hoc hypotheses (this is to say, the most
parsimonious exalanation is the best).
On Nov. 20, Ron Gatrelle Wrote:
"Phenotypic (how critters look to people)
subspeciation is the weakest and least significant type
of subspecific
delimitation."
My reply:
Again, there are no rules, or even published
suggestions as to which characters are more useful in
determining subspecific relationships than others. To
give meaning to the above statement, a formal
definition of a subspecies, along with information on
what characters should be used in the taxonomic
analysis must be presented.
On Nov. 20, 2001, Jaska Kullberg wrote:
"In general I feel that frigga is a good species to
represent a holarctic
species as it lives abundantly and commonly in
northern vet tundra
thorought Europe and N.Siberia."
My reply:
This type of statement is easily justifiable in the
eyes of the Biological Species Concept, or the
Ecological Species Concept, for example. There is
nothing "wrong" with this point of view, if those
species concepts seem reasonable and are justified by
their proponents.
On Nov. 20, 2001, Kenelm Philip wrote:
"I might hesitate to split off an allopatric species
based on such
a single character--but it would be interesting to know
how the European
population (if consistent across Europe) grades into
the Asian populations."
My reply:
This sounds like the BSC to me. Proponents of any of
the phylogenetic species concepts would have no problem
splitting off an allopatric species if it had a unique
and totally (as far as is known) universal character
that can be used to identify it. It wouldn't even
necessarily matter what that character is... There is
nothing wrong with Ken's point of view, since it is
easily justified under the BSC, at least.
On Nov. 20, 2001, Norbert Kondla wrote:
"Species as biological and evolutionary entities
are not defined by the scale of visual differences to
our human eyes -- they
are defined by a shared gene pool that has evolved
separately from other
organisms and there may or may not be huge visual
differences as seen
through our simple human eyes that only perceive a very
small part of the
electromagnetic spectrum."
My reply:
I am not sure which species concept these views are
consistent with. I ask how a researcher would know if
the organisms they are studying are united by a shared
gene pool that has evolved separately from other such
gene pools without exhaustive DNA analyses? This may
be a good theory but it cannot be applied to the field
without a huge grant and labor force. In fact, some
species concepts do define species on the basis of
visual differences (to the human eye).
On Nov. 20, 2001, Ron Gatrelle wrote:
"Now that mtDNA
studies have shown them to "be the same" (and if only
knowing the dna and
visual factors) we would now say these were the same
species.
There has to be a holistic understanding of each
organism to reach the
"correct" conclusion. Since so many have abandoned
subspecies, it is no
wonder that they now seem to be lumping the species
too."
My reply:
Two things here. Just because researchers failed to
find differences in a segment of mtDNA between
eurymedon and rutulus does not mean that the study
found the two taxa to be the same. They looked at a
small fragment on a single gene (one of well over a
thousand genes). Just because mtDNA segments in the
two taxa are the same does not prove the species are
the same. I think I am agreeing with Ron here, but the
DNA study did not conclude that the two taxa should be
treated as one; it concluded that the two taxa are very
closely related (I deal with interpretations such as
this in my own research all the time).
There can be a "correct" taxonomic conclusion (not
including ICZN-related issues here) only under the
context of a single and specific species concept.
However, to claim a "correct" taxonomic conclusion is
to claim that the species concept it is based on is
also correct. The huge body of literature summarized
in the Wheeler and Meier (2000) volume (which goes way
beyond the species concepts they elaborate upon)clearly
demonstrates that there is no one, single, correct
species concept. No concensus has been reached among
systematists. Therefore there can be no universally
correct taxonomic decision (an no taxonomically correct
listing, in the eyes of all species concepts). Use of
the word "correct" in this context can really only be
justified when dealing with taxonomical issues
regulated by the ICZN.
On Nov. 20, 2001, Chris Durden wrote:
"A vote for the "Holistic Species Concept" I take to be
equivalent to a vote
for the "Ecological Species Concept"."
This "holistic" view does sound like the Ecological or
the Evolutionary Species concept.
On Nov. 20, James Kruse wrote:
"I think that in most cases subspecies probably
represent clinal variation.
Individuals within a population are sometimes more
variable than individuals
between populations in several accepted subspecies.
Additionally the
"boundary lines" between subspecies often lay in
uncollected territory. In
the rest of the cases that do not lend themselves to
the above, I ask, if it
is so distinct why not name it a new species? Indeed,
workers in butterflies
stand in stark contrast against the rest of systematic
zoology on the point
of subspecies.
Because I think that subspecies are (generally) not
very useful, since you
typically need to know where they are from to know what
they are, does not
mean that I want to lump species. In fact, I wouldn't
lump a subspecies
unless I had the kind of evidence that I think is
necessary to make the
decision to raise it in the first place."
My reply:
Here we have a Phylogenetic species concept.
The point of this posting is to to demonstrate that
what makes a good species (or subspecies) depends on
your point of view. There is no right or wrong in the
world of species concepts, and until there is,
taxonomic lists will remain necessarily subjective and
tied to specific species concepts.
All the Best,
Andy Warren
PS: I would be interested in learning of any
publication that formally defines subspecies and how to
identify them in practice.
------------------------------------------------------------
For subscription and related information about LEPS-L visit:
http://www.peabody.yale.edu/other/lepsl
More information about the Leps-l
mailing list